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ABSTRACT

Fawley, Jessica. M.A., Purdue University, May 2015. Imaginative Resistance:
Unimaginable Narratives & Contested Realities in the Right to Die vs. Disability Rights
Perspectives on Medical Euthanasia. Major Professor: Ralph Webb.

In this thesis, I introduce a philosophic concept termed “imaginative resistance,” a
concept which targets the unimaginability of narratives, which I argue offers new insights
into polarized communication. I discuss the philosophic debate on imaginative resistance
to date, and piece out central puzzles and approaches. I show that imaginative resistance
can be applied to broader types of communication than those currently being discussed
by philosophers, and indicate that polarized debates are especially likely places to
uncover imaginative resistance. I discuss, and respond to, a recent article by Susan M.
Behuniak (2011) in which she analyzes a subsection of the contemporary medical
euthanasia debate and concludes that with mutual understanding of the word “dignity”
the sides should be able to communicate better. I then do my own analysis, focusing
particularly on the perspective of the disability rights advocacy group involved in
Behuniak’s analysis, Not Dead Yet, and I analyze key texts from this group using the
theory of imaginative resistance. My analysis reveals that beneath their rhetoric is a
particular worldview and set of fears which provoke a refusal or inability to imagine that
the claims made by their primary opponent, Compassion & Choices, could possibly be
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correct, therefore inhibiting their ability to engage with Compassion & Choices). I show
that understanding this worldview and set of fears is essential to understanding their
rhetorical choices, and that if effective debate requires understanding then the barriers
present to effective debate are considerably more substantial than the use or interpretation
of the word “dignity.” I also suggest other debates in which this theory may prove useful,
as well as further explorations of the theory alongside incommensurability.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The current rhetorical climate in the United States reflects increasing polarization of
viewpoints, including, and possibly rooted in, political polarization. According to the
Pew Research Center, political polarization has increased dramatically along a variety of
indicators in the past two decades, resulting in 70% of Democrats and Republicans who
are highly involved with politics aligning ideologically with their party, which more than
doubles the number of two decades prior (Doherty, 2014). Along with this, there has
been dramatically increased animosity between the parties and a refusal to compromise
on equal terms (Doherty, 2014).
Disagreements regarding the levels, extents, and types of this polarization
continue in academic circles (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2011; McCarty, Poole, &
Rosenthall, 2006; Prior, 2007; Warner & McKinney, 2013; Iyengar et al., 2012), though
the over-arching picture is becoming much clearer. Values and strongly voiced beliefs by
those on the right and left are becoming more pronounced; those on either side share
fewer values with the other side than in the past, and even those who express values from
both sides of the American political spectrum tend to feel more anger and animosity
toward those who disagree than one might previously have expected from a moderate
(Warner & McKinney, 2013; Doherty, 2014).
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The rhetorical strategy sometimes called polarization, which crystalizes enemies,
may be partially to blame (Harpine, 2009); however, it is not the cause of polarization nor
this rhetorical strategy with which I engage in this paper. Instead, I engage with the state
of being polarized, what this state entails, and the rhetorical obstacles polarization creates,
as can be illuminated by a theory often referred to as “imaginative resistance.”
For the purposes of this thesis, I define polarization as a state in which sharp
divergences in ideology or worldview which are rooted in different conceptions of values,
priorities, and reality result in hostility toward, or an inability to understand, the
perspectives on the other side of the disagreement. In essence, when two polarized sides
try to engage in a debate, they experience enormous obstacles to understanding each
other, obstacles which may be so severe as to drive an observer to say that they cannot
understand each other. Polarization, then, is a serious problem, as lack of understanding
precludes meaningful debate. As the foundational new rhetorician I. A. Richards stated,
“[T]he chief lesson to be learnt…is the futility of all argumentation that precedes
understanding. We cannot profitably attack any opinion until we have discovered what it
expresses as well as what it states…” (Richards, 1991, p. 28). I will return to this passage
and its significance in what follows. For now, it is important to note that the focus of this
thesis is to propose a new way to foster understanding in polarized debates.
I propose that a philosophic concept can help us understand the aspects of
polarization which relate to a deepening inability or unwillingness to engage with
narratives that directly contradict or are believed to be opposed to one’s deeply held
narratives of value or sense of reality. This philosophic concept is often called
“imaginative resistance,” and, in the discipline of philosophy, this concept is currently
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applied to works of fiction. In this thesis, I argue that imaginative resistance illuminates
several important dimensions of polarization in real-world communication, thereby
allowing us to consider these kinds of conflict in a different light: the light of
unimaginable narratives.
According to contemporary philosophers, imaginative resistance is, roughly, the
refusal or inability to fully engage with a work of fiction due to propositions that the
reader does not believe could be true in the fictional world. As I discuss this theory, I am
engaging in a discussion that centers around philosopher and cognitive scientist Tamar
Szabó Gendler and philosophers Kendall Walton and Brian Weatherson. I draw on these
discussions as well as traditions of rhetoric and a contemporary polarized debate to show
that this theory has strong potential for application in communication.
To explore the value of the theory of imaginative resistance for application to
communication, I use the theory in this work to analyze a subsection of the medical
euthanasia debate: the debate between disability rights activists and right to die advocates
over the question of whether disabled and terminally ill patients should be allowed to end
their lives via what is sometimes (contentiously) called “medically assisted suicide.”
Briefly, right to die activists claim that the right to choose the time and manner of one’s
death is a human right, while disability activists contend that any such practice results in
pressure upon the disabled to end their lives.
One key feature of this debate has been the way each side has used the concept
“dignity.” Right to die activists have insisted upon the right to a “death with dignity,”
while disability rights activists have argued that pressure to end the lives of the ill and
disabled robs these populations of the basic dignity of personhood.
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My discussion focuses on a study of this concept of dignity in this debate by
Susan M. Behuniak, “Death with ‘dignity’: The wedge that divides the disability rights
movement from the right to die movement.” I discuss Behuniak’s analysis and her
findings. I then argue that her analysis, while insightful, misses a key underlying point,
which the theory of imaginative resistance elucidates. Behuniak’s idea is that the
disagreement between the two groups may be fruitfully understood by analyzing the way
each sides uses the term “dignity.” She uses this term as a wedge into the worldviews of
the two sides. My response is to argue that, on the contrary, without a prior
understanding of the worldviews or perspectives of the two sides of the debate, it is easy
to misunderstand the way each side is using the term “dignity.” The key issue in
miscommunication between the two sides is much deeper than what appears on the
surface to be two different concepts of “dignity.” It is, actually, an issue of differing—
and incompatible—conceptions of reality. These conceptions of reality, and the place
that dignity—the concept, not the term—holds in each of them, must be grasped before
the way the term “dignity” is used by each side can be understood.
To put it simply, Behuniak argues that an analysis of the rhetorical use of specific
terms can help us to understand the worldviews of opposing sides. I, on the other hand,
argue that only by understanding the worldviews of opposing sides may we correctly
analyze each sides’ rhetorical use of terms. Because each side of the debate can (more or
less literally) not even imagine the worldview that the other side takes for granted, each
side inevitably mistakes what the other side means by “dignity.” Attempts by each side to
understand how the other side could possibly believe that its way of doing things is the
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right way to protect the “dignity” of the disabled and dying can therefore be met with
only incomprehension, misunderstanding, anger, and rejection.
I make two major claims in this thesis:

(I) Imaginative resistance is a broader phenomenon than has been
noted by philosophers to date, a phenomenon which does not
simply encompass responses to fictional narratives but real-world
narratives as well.

(II) Imaginative resistance to real-world narratives sheds light on
the deep miscommunications involved in polarized communication,
and, as such, this phenomenon has serious implications for the
study of communication in a variety of areas.

I argue both of these claims in multiple parts of this thesis. In Chapter 2, I ground
my discussion in the contemporary medical euthanasia debate. After briefly discussing
the debate as a whole, I discuss and analyze Behuniak’s analysis of two groups which
operate from the perspectives of the right to die and disability studies, and begin to set the
stage for re-analyzing these groups for unimaginable narratives and contested realities.
In Chapter 3, I switch gears to explaining the theory of imaginative resistance as being
discussed by philosophers, as I begin to set the stage for re-analyzing Behuniak’s sources.
In Chapter 4, I highlight essential features of imaginative resistance which are essential to
communication and discard others. In this chapter, I outline what imaginative resistance
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looks like in communication. In Chapter 5, I return to Behuniak’s analysis, and do my
own analysis of the two sides of the medical euthanasia debate which she analyzed, this
time using the theory of imaginative resistance to guide my analysis in order to find much
deeper obstacles for communication than those Behuniak observed. Finally, in Chapter 6,
I state my conclusions, discuss how imaginative resistance adds to the concept of
incommensurability, and propose future directions for the exploration and application of
imaginative resistance in communication.
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CHAPTER 2. THE MEDICAL EUTHANASIA DEBATE AND BEHUNIAK’S
ANALYSIS OF “DIGNITY”

2.1

The Medical Euthanasia Debate: A Brief Overview

Medical euthanasia, sometimes referred to as “physician assisted suicide” or “physician
assisted death,” is the practice by which a physician or other health professional uses her
position to bring about the death of a patient, usually to address the suffering of a
terminally ill patient. The question of whether medical euthanasia should be permitted in
any form, and if so, in which forms, has become increasingly important as our medical
technology continues to increase our lifespan while, at times, being unable to relieve our
suffering or allow patients to continue living a life they find to be “dignified” or
“valuable” (Hyde, 2001; Behuniak, 2011).
Medical euthanasia is a debate which elicits strong emotions from those involved.
Perhaps these strong emotions stem from experiences with the suffering of loved ones,
the knowledge that all of us are likely to eventually face these issues as patients or loved
ones of patients, and perhaps because of strong feelings, generally, about the sanctity of
life, the horrors of suffering, or the grief of those left behind when someone dies by
whatever means (Hyde, 2001; Behuniak, 2011; Dolmage, 2014).
This impassioned debate is often framed as having two primary sides: (1) the
conservative rejection of medical euthanasia as “murder,” “suicide,” or a betrayal of the
religiously-based Hippocratic Oath, which forbids the taking of a life; and (2) the liberal
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entreaty that people have the “right to die” rather than suffer the pain, anguish, and
“indignities” of a medically prolonged life (Behuniak, 2011; Hyde, 2001).
There are other major divides in this debate, however. One is the divide between
those advocating for different permissible and impermissible types of medical euthanasia,
a debate which usually emphasizes two sides: active and passive euthanasia (James, 2005;
Hyde, 2001). Passive euthanasia is the withholding of medical treatment, thereby
allowing the patient to die of natural causes. Active euthanasia is the hastening of the
patient’s death, often with the administering of a lethal dose of medicine such as
potassium chloride (Hyde, 2001). Passive euthanasia is currently permitted and practiced
widely under strict conditions of consent, but some argue that the difference between
passive and active euthanasia is negligible; if you allow one, you should allow the other
out of compassion for the slowly-dying (James, 2005; Hyde, 2001). A middle ground
often championed by those who oppose active euthanasia (Not Dead Yet, 2015; Brown,
2015, February 5), which is meant to be more passive than active and is currently legal in
the United States as well, is the act of putting a patient into a medically-induced coma
and withholding nutrients and treatments until the patient dies, though this approach is
sometimes seen as particularly cruel and hard for the family of the dying patient to
withstand due to the waiting and the wasting effects on the patient (Behuniak, 2011;
Hyde, 2001).
Another major divide in the medical euthanasia debate is far less frequently
discussed. This is the divide between progressives, some of whom align themselves with
a “right to die” perspective, and others, disability rights activists, who condemn medical
euthanasia as a dangerous extension of existing myths and prejudices against individuals
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with disabilities. It is this division which becomes the focus of Behuniak’s (2011)
analysis as well as my own.

2.1.1

Behuniak’s Methods

Behuniak (2011) notices that right to die activists and disability activists seem to be using
a single word with high frequency but with differing meaning. The word is “dignity.” In
order to explore the specifics of this term’s usage in different camps, Behuniak selects
two activism organizations whose rhetoric she analyzes: one from the right to die
perspective, called Compassion & Choices, and another from the disability rights
perspective, called Not Dead Yet. Drawing upon Deborah Stone (2002) and Rochefort
and Cobb (1994), Behuniak argues that “dignity” has a “problem definition,” which
means that different sides of the debate define the term differently. She argues that this,
then, creates significant obstacles to policy discussion and agreement. Behuniak analyzes
pamphlets and, in particular, websites and legal advocacy, and compares and contrasts
the two groups’ uses of the word “dignity” to uncover differences in intended meaning.
Crucially, Behuniak argues that these differing definitions of the term “dignity” provide
insight into the two groups’ central concerns as political activists.
To understand the conceptualizations of “dignity” used by Compassion & Choices
and Not Dead Yet, Behuniak draws upon philosophical and medical definitions and
explorations of the term “dignity,” especially as they relate to the topics of death and
dying. First, Behuniak outlines five key questions about the nature of dignity. These are
as follows:
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(1) Is dignity “something inherent, bestowed, or something people
earn” (p. 21)?
(2) Is dignity essentially an ability to exercise “autonomy”?
(3) Is there a difference between “pain relief” and “putting an end
to suffering” (p. 21)?
(4) Is dignity a characteristic of death or only of life?
(5) Is dignity a value which should be upheld or a status which
requires prescribed actions?

Let’s take a moment to consider these five questions. First, one can imagine that
it makes a considerable difference whether an individual means to be expressing that
dignity is inherent versus earned. If dignity is inherent, then to obstruct someone’s
dignity may be understood to be a violation, or it may be that you cannot disrupt dignity,
no matter what you do. If dignity is earned, then the questions become “how?”, “to what
effect?”, and “what obligation, if any, do others have to make the earning of dignity
possible, easier, or more restricted?” However, for Behuniak, these consequences and
others of the terms are not of the utmost importance; her analysis is one which is focused
on understanding the meaning intended by each party when they use the term “dignity.”
Behuniak emphasizes that this definitional question can be understood as a
“spectrum” with two extremes. On one extreme, she says, sits the philosopher Immanuel
Kant, “who maintained that dignity is an unconditional attribute of human beings as
rational creatures” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 21), an attribute which can be neither gained nor
lost. On the other extreme, she says, sits medical ethicist Arthur Caplan, “who maintains
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that dignity is a moral creation, bestowed by the community, and so is not an attribute
inherently possessed by any person” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 21). Again, Behuniak does not
explore the ramifications of these sides, but only notes these differences to emphasize
that conceptual disagreements exist about the term “dignity.”
The second question Behuniak considers is a disagreement about “[t]he exact
nature of dignity” (2011, p. 21). She points to the use of the word “autonomy” as “the
most frequently used synonym used to explain ‘dignity’” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 21).
Drawing upon the works of Lois Shepherd (1998), Behuniak notes that there is little
disagreement about the definition of “autonomy” in relation to medical euthanasia:
autonomy “refers to a personal right over decisions affecting one’s own life” (p. 21). She
further engages with Shepherd’s work to note that the term seems to have been
appropriated from the abortion debate to mean the equivalent of “choice,” which some
regard as a mistake. She does not explain why, though, or what effect these uses may
have.
In regards to her third question, whether there is a difference between dignity as
“pain relief” and dignity as “putting an end to suffering” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 21),
Behuniak emphasizes the difference between the purely physical “pain” and the broadly
encompassing “suffering” which includes distress ranging from physical to spiritual and
relational. She further notes that sometimes these terms are used interchangeably,
without precision.
Her fourth question emphasizes the dilemma of whether there even can be dignity
in death and dying, or whether dignity is a characteristic purely of life and living.
Drawing upon the writing of surgeon Sherwin Nuland (1993), Behuniak raises concerns
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about the phrase “death with dignity,” and whether it is possible to die with dignity at all.
Exactly how this question relates to conceptualizations of “dignity” by the two groups in
question is unclear.
Behuniak’s fifth question relates to whether “dignity can be objective or
subjective” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 22). Behuniak notes here that it may not be possible to
give dignity, but it may be possible to try to “prevent indignities” through prescribed
actions which “better attend to the individual patient” (p. 22).
These questions present the complexity of the term “dignity” and set the stage for
the most important definitional distinction in her analysis, which is the distinction
between what she calls “basic”—or “Kantian”—dignity on the one hand, and “personal”
dignity, on the other. Basic or Kantian dignity refers to “inherent and inalienable
universal value for individuals” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 22). To elaborate and clarify,
Immanuel Kant claimed that respect is owed to all people just because they are people
(i.e., free, rational beings, a definition which may pose some obstacles, but need not be a
focus of this analysis) (Dillon, 2014). The idea is that all people are deserving of respect.
To respect a person, in the Kantian sense, is to acknowledge that a person must be treated
as an end in him or herself rather than merely as a means to an end (Dillon, 2014).
Another way of putting this—outlined by Daryl Pullman (2002) and employed by
Behuniak—is to say that “basic dignity” is respect for personhood. Pullman and
Behuniak both note that some in the medical euthanasia debate regard basic dignity as
inalienable, while others claim that it can be—and too often is—stripped away during the
process of dying.
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The second type of dignity, which contrasts with basic dignity, is referred to as
“personal dignity” (Pullman, 2002; Behuniak, 2011). Personal dignity is rather like
“decorum”; it is the sense of “dignity” that is generally meant when one says that a
person has “suffered an indignity” or when a slighted person says “allow me my dignity.”
Personal dignity, according to Pullman, is a concept “more particular, individualistic, and
transient in nature” (p. 76) than basic dignity. Personal dignity aligns with individual
preferences, the idea of the beautiful life, and personal goals (Pullman, 2002; Behuniak,
2011). When one says that a disabled a person has “lost some dignity” because he needs
assistance in bathing or using the bathroom, for example, the kind of dignity in question
is personal dignity.
Once this key difference between basic and personal dignity is established,
Behuniak examines uses of the term “dignity” by the two activist organizations,
Compassion & Choices and Not Dead Yet. She argues that these uses show that each
side uses the term “dignity” to refer to different conceptualizations of dignity.

2.1.1.1 Behuniak’s Findings
Behuniak analyzes the rhetorical choices of Compassion & Choices and Not Dead Yet,
and concludes that they are using the term “dignity” in different ways. According to her
analysis, Compassion & Choices intends to refer to personal dignity, while Not Dead Yet
intends to refer to basic dignity (Behuniak, 2011).
Behuniak notes that Compassion & Choices, the group that advocates for the right
to die, consistently uses stories of personal suffering and desires, and combines these
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with three overarching themes: “bans on physical assisted death force terminally ill
people to endure pain and suffering,” “the terminally ill are denied their legal rights to
privacy, liberty, and personal autonomy” and the bans “impose indignities on the dying”
which become obstacles to “achieving a ‘good death’” (2011, p. 24). Further emphasis is
placed by Compassion & Choices on individuals being able to define for themselves what
a “good death” is and how much is too much pain and suffering. By analyzing pamphlets,
legal briefs, and other materials, Behuniak provides a consistent picture of Compassion &
Choices’ messages, and concludes that they are consistently referring to personal dignity
and that, therefore, personal dignity, not basic dignity, is their focus.
Behuniak writes that the use of personal dignity rhetoric by Compassion and
Choices suggests a particular worldview. According to this worldview, “It is important to
control one’s own death and implement one’s own vision of a good death; taking action
in response to pain and suffering is an ethical act; and human rights must be recognized
as including a right to control and determine the manner and time of one’s own death”
(2011, p. 24).
In contrast, Behuniak’s analysis of Not Dead Yet, the disability rights group,
provides a picture of a group concerned with the right to be respected and allowed to
live—even when society in its fear of different bodies would believe that people with
disabilities might prefer to die (2011). Not Dead Yet takes issue with rhetoric which
suggests or outright states that it is “an indignity for a person to become dependent”
(Behuniak, 2011, p. 23). And, furthermore, there are concerns that the idea of being able
to choose to die creates the false sense that it is a genuine choice when people are unable
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to receive or afford the treatment and care they need in a system without universal
healthcare and which discriminates against people with disabilities (Behuniak, 2011).
Behuniak parses these arguments from Not Dead Yet into three strands. First,
there is a “deadly double standard” which legally protects those who do not have
disabilities from suicidal behavior, but encourages and permits suicidal behavior in those
with disabilities, including the terminally ill (Not Dead Yet, 2011, as cited in Behuniak,
2011). Quoting Clair Lewis (2010), Behuniak summarizes the first strand of argument as
follows, “It seems that disabled people are the only people who can be suicidal and
mentally competent at the same time” (p. 26).
Second, Not Dead Yet points out that, legally, people with disabilities are not
protected as a “suspect class,” as racial or ethnic minorities are. Being classified as a
“suspect class” acknowledges the dangers of discrimination against a particular group in
our culture, and grants potentially life-saving protection from that discrimination
(Behuniak, 2011). Not being included as a suspect class means that people with
disabilities are not afforded this protection, or this serious, legal acknowledgement of the
risk that prejudice may influence decisions regarding their wellbeing and even survival.
Third, Not Dead Yet challenges people to see that choice in dying should be
allowed for all or restricted to all, equally, disabled or not, terminally ill or not, if the
central issue is, indeed, choice, rather than discrimination. In other words, the argument
is that medical euthanasia should be an option freely given to anyone in any circumstance,
or it should not be given to anyone in any circumstance. Restricting medical euthanasia
to those with disabilities or terminal diseases (Not Dead Yet views terminal illness as a
type of disability) means that the law does not believe that the life of a disabled person is
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as valuable as the life of a non-disabled person, and, in fact, the law may be stating that
the life has no value at all (Behuniak, 2011).
It is clear, here, that Not Dead Yet is using dignity rhetoric which evokes,
primarily, concerns of basic dignity. The issue here is whether governments, legal
systems, physicians, and people on the street are recognizing that people with disabilities
should be regarded as having full-blown personhood at all. If they deserve to be regarded
with respect, as having inalienable basic dignity, then people with disabilities (including
the terminally ill) should not be allowed, as a special case, to commit suicide, whether
aided or unaided. Only through the idea that people with disabilities are lesser and
undignified in their very existence can we institute laws which make it legal for such
people to kill themselves or receive aid in doing so while not permitting this devil’s
bargain, “autonomy,” to all people (Behuniak, 2011). In other words, Not Dead Yet is
using stark basic dignity rhetoric, charging others in the debate and the broader culture of
lethally failing to recognize the basic personhood of people with disabilities.

2.1.1.1.1 Why Both Groups Are Concerned with Basic Dignity
Behuniak claims that the rhetorical choices of these two groups—exemplified in the way
they use the term “dignity” and the arguments they present using it—give us insight into
the two groups’ worldviews. However, by using an investigation of the term “dignity” to
arrive at an understanding of each group’s worldview, Behuniak misses the key point that
each group is fighting a different kind of public battle which may be affecting their
rhetorical choices. I argue that by engaging in a method of investigation that proceeds
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from term to worldview rather than the other way around, Behuniak is misconstruing
purposeful political rhetoric for core organizational values.
I explore these issues in detail in Chapter 5, but I would like to introduce the key
ideas here. First, Compassion & Choices and Not Dead Yet occupy very different spheres
of power. Not Dead Yet is representing a minority group which experiences pervasive
discrimination, discrimination which focuses on the devaluing of the personhood of the
person who has a disability. One would expect a group facing these challenges to their
basic dignity to use rhetoric which specifically addresses this issue. Compassion &
Choices occupies a relatively privileged position, because they seek to represent those
who do not disagree, necessarily, with the pervasive discrimination against individuals
with disabilities. Instead, they wish to challenge the Hippocratic Oath and its service to
individuals during the dying process. In a country which has a large and powerful
political party which emphasizes in a great array of policy stances a dedication to choice
and self-determination, this perspective is best stated through rhetoric of freedom and
autonomy, in other words, rhetoric which aligns with issues of personal dignity.
Is the underlying concern which Compassion & Choices has one of personal
dignity? I argue that it is not. Behuniak so quickly defines basic and personal dignity
that she forgets that a respect for the individual interests of a person is built into basic
dignity, at least if we are to understand basic dignity as Kantian dignity. Regarding
others as “an end in themselves” rather than just a “means to an end,” as Kant so
frequently puts it, requires seeing past the way one would prefer to regard a person and
the goals which one has, including upholding the Hippocratic Oath, to the needs, interests,
and rational personhood of that person. Allowing one’s own interest in upholding the
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Hippocratic Oath or safeguarding the religiously understood sanctity of life against the
will of the terminally ill person may be understood to be using a person as a mere means
to an end, with the end being the upholding of your own values and interests. To put that
differently, respecting the basic dignity of a person may mean, under some circumstances,
respecting her personhood more than her life. To force a rational person to continue
living beyond her wish to live is to subordinate her personhood to her mere biological life.
It may be to treat her personhood as a means to an end—her life. This is a violation of
basic dignity.
The battle, here, is for the basic dignity of all persons. On one side, Compassion
and Choices is concerned that the basic dignity of the suffering and dying person, and his
or her family, is being disregarded in favor of antiquated laws. On the other side, Not
Dead Yet is concerned that the basic dignity of people with disabilities is under an
intense, new level of threat from medical euthanasia which puts the devaluing of those
with disabilities to the new extreme (at least outside of tyrannical cleansing) of simply
allowing, condoning, and causing their death for no reason other than disability.
The key point is that—pace Behuniak and despite appearances—each side in the
medical euthanasia debate is defending the same basic value: basic dignity. But the
rhetoric of each side reveals that each side takes itself to be alone in defending that value.
From the point of view of Not Dead Yet, it is defending basic dignity while opposition
groups incorrectly, even monstrously, place personal dignity ahead of basic dignity in the
overall scheme of values. From the point of view of Compassion and Choices, it is
defending the autonomy of the terminally ill from the pressure of opposition groups who
would force the terminally ill to remain alive at all terrible costs. That is, Compassion &
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Choices believes they must defend the terminally ill from groups who would sacrifice the
personhood of the terminally ill on the altars of their lives.
Each side is thus living in a reality, or narrative world, which is characterized by
different, fundamentally incompatible conceptions of both their own and others’ roles,
concerns, and actions. These differing conceptions shape and limit what each side finds
itself able to imagine about the experiences, needs, and arguments of others who exist in,
or conceive through, an incompatible reality (or worldview). Each side can, more-or-less
literally, not even imagine that the other side is doing something which can be
characterized as “defending basic dignity.” Therefore, each side cannot imagine that the
other side is genuinely respecting the highest interests of those who are dying and/or
disabled.
As previously noted, I explore these claims and the evidence for them at length in
Chapter 5. First, we must understand the theory that helps me to arrive at these, and more
detailed, claims: the theory of imaginative resistance.
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CHAPTER 3. DEFINING IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE IN PHILOSOPHY

3.1

Introducing Imaginative Resistance

Imaginative resistance is a concept that comes out of a contemporary philosophic debate
that bridges areas ranging from aesthetics to philosophy of mind, and is rooted in
arguments from philosopher and cognitive scientist Tamar Szabó Gendler and
philosophers Kendall Walton and Brian Weatherson. Defined simply, imaginative
resistance occurs when a reader becomes unwilling or unable to engage with a work of
fiction due to propositions within the work. This is interesting because readers,
according to philosophers engaged in this debate, usually allow authors to define every
dimension of a fictional world. Why, then, are there kinds of claims, such as deviant
moral claims, that readers appear to reject and respond to with a disengagement from the
work of fiction? In the next section, I delve into debates on, and divisions of, imaginative
resistance, but, for now, we will consider this a relatively unified theory.
A classic example of a sentence in a work of fiction that we are supposed to resist
is the following:

(A) In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was
a girl. (Walton & Tanner, 1994)

21
It is important to understand that in (A) the narrator of the fiction is the one
talking—not some deranged character within the narrative—and the narrator is intended
to be taken as stating a truth about the fictional world. The narrator is telling the reader
that it is true in this particular fictional world that the killing of female babies is morally
correct. While we may tolerate this kind of statement from a character in a work of
fiction, or even as a characterization of the beliefs of an entire culture, we will not
tolerate, according to the general theory of imaginative resistance, this kind of statement
from a narrator of the type that is supposed to present objective truth-claims about the
fictional world. If the narrator attempts to assert that (A) is simply true in the fictional
world then the reader will reject the assertion. The reader may experience what is
referred to as a “doubling of the narrator,” a response in which the reader simply views
the author as mistaken rather than ascribing to, and asserting, the truths of the fictional
world (Gendler, 2000), or a number of other specific responses defined in the debate.
However, it is generally agreed upon that readers will (or should) experience imaginative
resistance to (A) because an impossible or fundamentally objectionable truth-claim has
been asserted.
The so-called puzzle of imaginative resistance comes about by observing the
conflict between these two claims:

(1) Readers seem to have little trouble imagining or accepting
fictional worlds that contain truths that do not exist in the actual (or
“real”) world—truths about magic or time travel, for example.
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(2) Readers seem far less tolerant of deviations in moral truths in
works of fiction, such as it being true in a fictional world that it is
right to kill someone for slowing traffic (Weatherson, 2004), or
logical truths such as the features of shapes (Yablo, 2002) or basic
mathematics (Gendler, 2000).

In other words, why is it that readers will accept a great variety of impossible and
fantastical truths in a fictional world, but eventually draw a line at certain types of claims?
Why will readers reject amoral truth-claims, illogical assertions, or violations of basic
mathematics? Theories of imaginative resistance can be thought of as attempts to solve
this so-called puzzle.
Work in philosophy to date, though, has assumed these theories to be exclusively
about works of fiction because they have taken for granted a third claim:

(3) This phenomenon is unique to reader engagement with works
of fiction, and perhaps even only, literary fiction due to the
explicitness of communication between the author and reader
(Nanay, 2010).

Literary fiction, here, is the subset of fictional works which are written, such as
novels and epic poetry. Examples of non-literary fiction for which some philosophers
have argued that imaginative resistance does not—or cannot—occur include film and
visual art (Nanay, 2010). Some have argued that imaginative resistance requires an
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author or narrator which makes explicit truth-claims. In works without explicit truth
claims, the receiver may be able to interpret information in a greater variety of ways,
allowing for less pressure to resist truth-claims. I discuss exactly what this means in
detail in the coming pages.
Given that this philosophic debate was inspired by an aside by David Hume about
epic poetry, which I discuss shortly, (3) has been an unchallenged assumption since the
debate began. It has been assumed by the philosophers in this debate, and, in the case of
Nanay (2010), explicitly noted, that there is something special about the depth of
communication between an author and reader that simply is not present in other media.
One receives more explicit information about the fictional world in the narrative claims
of authors than one does in most, if not all, movies, music, or other artistic media. The
explicitness of this communication and the understanding by the reader that certain
claims made by the narrator are authorial truth-claim declarations of a reality they wish
the reader to consider as true is central to my argument. This layer of perceived authorreader communication about reality is essential to understanding how imaginative
resistance applies to broader, real-world communication.
As noted, I am interested in seeing how theories developed in response to the
puzzle generated by (1) and (2) can be employed to understand issues of polarization in
the medical euthanasia debate. Therefore, as noted, I am deeply concerned with, and
consistently disputing claim (3).
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3.1.1

Current Debates: Four Key Hypotheses

The concept of “imaginative resistance” was first introduced by philosopher and
cognitive scientist Tamar Szabó Gendler (2000) in response to an article on fictional
morality by Kendall Walton and Michael Tanner (1994). Gendler and others trace the
idea back to David Hume. In “On the Standard of Taste” (1985/1757), Hume makes a
series of relevant observations:

Where speculative errors may be found in the polite writings of
any age or country, they detract but little from the value of those
compositions. There needs to be but a certain turn of thought or
imagination to make us enter into all the opinions, which then
prevailed, and relish the sentiments or conclusions derived from
them. But a very violent effort is requisite to change our judgment
of manners, and excite sentiments of approbation or blame, love or
hatred, different from those to which the mind for long custom has
been familiarized….I cannot, nor is it proper that I should, enter
into such sentiments. (p. 247, emphasis in original)

Hume’s original point was that morally jarring claims or episodes in a work of
fiction make it difficult for the reader to smoothly enjoy the work of fiction, and so
should be regarded as flaws. Morally flawed artworks are, for Hume, aesthetically
flawed; and it is correct to so judge them. In response to Hume, Walton (1994) claims
that a moral failing in a work of fiction which causes imaginative resistance (or should
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cause imaginative resistance) in readers does not necessarily result in an aesthetic
deformity of the work, as characterized by a blemish on the artistic value of the work (p.
29). In fact, we should be able to “regard the work as possessing aesthetic value,”
regardless of its moral content (Walton & Tanner, 1994, p. 29). The question of whether
we should permit the moral content of a work of fiction to affect our judgment of the
work’s aesthetic value, as opposed to whether it is psychologically necessary, is an
ethical question. That Walton and Hume provide opposing answers to this ethical
question first underscores a profound difference in their characterizations of imaginative
resistance.
Walton describes an intellectual phenomenon, a limit to the imagination which is
divorced from emotion, while Hume describes an experience which has deep emotional
and corresponding physical and intellectual manifestations. These feelings of repulsion
and anger, even righteous anger, are strong responses, resulting in a reflexive refusal to
appreciate the aesthetics of the work as separate from its moral content. This is a very
strong response which is more accurately described by Gendler than by Walton.
In “Imaginative Resistance Revisited” (2006b), Gendler disagrees with Walton.
She articulates the relevant aspects of the above passage from Hume, and calls this
“Humean resistance.” Humean resistance requires two aspects:

(1) Cases of the “troubling class” (i.e., which cause Humean
resistance) involve “valenced normative appraisals” (Gendler,
2006, p. 153, emphasis in original).
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(2) These cases “require the reader’s imaginative involvement” (p.
153, emphasis in original).

With regard to (1), we are being asked to make judgments about the rightness or
wrongness, the mannerliness or unmannerliness, or praiseworthiness or blameworthiness
of something along a normative spectrum (Gendler, 2006b). With regard to (2), being
asked to imagine (rather than simply postulate) is an active engagement, not a passive
one. It is the reader herself who is being asked to make this judgment, to perhaps agree
with depictions in the work, and to “enter into” some “vicious” frame of mind by
engaging with the written work (Gendler, 2006b).
Gendler recognizes a point about Hume’s work here that has been customarily
overlooked in the recent work on imaginative resistance: Hume was making observations
“primarily” about non-fiction rather than fiction (2006b, pp. 149-150). Of course, since
the concern of the current thesis is the prospect for using imaginative resistance in
communication studies, Gendler’s observation is fortuitous. However, what remains true
is that Hume is discussing written works of non-fiction. In this thesis, I suggest that not
only are philosophers currently focusing too narrowly on fiction, but that both Hume and
the contemporary philosophers are wrong to assume that this is primarily a concern of
written works. I return to this issue in Sections III and IV.
Walton’s argument includes appraisals of aesthetic value, but also appraisals of
reader rejection (1994). Walton argues that imaginative resistance occurs when the
reader’s moral reality conflicts with a fictional morality being presented as true for the
fictional world (1994, p. 38). While the reader is able to imagine characters (wrongly)
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believing morally deviant claims, she is unable to imagine sufficient justifications for the
deviant claims and, therefore, cannot conceive of a world in which the deviant claims are
actually true rather than just mistakenly believed by a character or society (1994, p. 49).
As such, the reader is unable to imagine this fictional world as a morally possible world
(1994, p. 49). Walton argues that this occurs because moral principles supervene upon
non-moral facts, thus making it impossible for an author to present acts such as genocide
or slavery as moral and avoid causing imaginative resistance in readers who subscribe to
“appropriate,” contemporary moral standards (1994, p. 45).
Gendler calls Walton’s theory the impossibility hypothesis (Gendler, 2000, p. 66)
or, later, a version of the cantian theories (Gendler, 2006b; Liao & Gendler, in press). In
other words, Walton is asserting that imaginative resistance occurs because the reader
cannot engage with the fictional claim, whereas Gendler is asserting that imaginative
resistance occurs because the reader will not engage with the fictional claim.
In “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance” (2000), Gendler argues that the
impossibility hypothesis is false, that Walton has not found “the source” of the puzzle (pp.
56 and 66, emphasis added). According to Gendler, it is not that a reader is incapable of
imagining a morally deviant fictional world, but rather that the reader is unwilling to do
so (Gendler, 2000, 2006b; Liao & Gendler, in press). She argues that we fear we may be
manipulated into believing a deviant moral claim in the real world if we permit ourselves
to entertain the idea that it is true in the fictional world (Gendler, 2000, p. 56). In other
words, simply imagining deviant moral claims may cause moral contagion, an
inadvertent absorption of ideas we disapprove of through an involuntary psychological
process resulting from us being imperfect pretenders (Gendler, 2006a, 2006b). A
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“perfect pretender” would be able to imagine claims, ideas, or realities which are untrue
while maintaining the awareness that they are untrue, both intellectually and behaviorally
(Gendler, 2006a). However, as imperfect pretenders, people may still intellectually
understand that something is not true while nevertheless being infected behaviorally or
subconsciously by the imagined ideas, which Gendler notes is supported by findings in
psychology which have tested participant response to a variety of situations with or
without having first imagined certain situations, such as additional bystanders who could
respond to an emergency when none are actually present (2006a). We will call this
approach the moral contagion hypothesis.
Gendler bases her conclusions on a set of observations. She observes that there
are many facts and beliefs about the actual world which are imported into fiction (such as
period dress or details of a submarine in realistic fiction or even humanoid appearance or
parent-child relationships in science fiction, perhaps). In addition to these imported facts
or beliefs, there is an impetus to export ideas as well (such as details about period dress or
submarines one did not previously know) (Gendler, 2000, p. 76). Therefore, moral
claims are, or threaten to be, exported from the fictional world into the actual world,
which causes readers to resist deviant moral claims which they fear they may come to
believe are true in the actual world (Gendler, 2000, 2006a).
Using Liao & Gendler’s (in press; Gendler, 2006b) terms, Walton’s impossibility
hypothesis is one of two essential cantian perspectives, whereas Gendler’s moral
contagion hypothesis is the essential wontian perspective. Cantian perspectives, as noted,
emphasize that readers cannot imagine what the author is asking them to imagine,
whereas wontian perspectives claim that readers will not (“won’t”) imagine it.
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There are two other approaches that are essential to understanding the
contemporary debate, and its applicability to real-world communication. The first comes
from Brian Weatherson (2004), and his, as categorized by Gendler, is also a cantian
perspective (Liao & Gendler, in press). The second, which I discuss subsequently, is
from Brence Nanay (2010), who proposes a sort of wontian perspective focused on genre
and conversational implicature.
In “Morality, Fiction, and Possibility”, Weatherson (2004) argues for what I call
the attention-to-conflict hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, imaginative resistance
occurs when ethical or intellectual claims are made by an author which we believe are
untrue or impossible and are sufficiently featured in the story to attract attention to the
problem (p. 18). In other words, we can ignore impossibilities which are not made clear
to us, such as the impossibility of a cow jumping over the moon, but we will reject it if
the details of the cow’s physiology and the nature of outer space are discussed, as such
details would highlight the impossibility of the scenario (pp. 10-11, 18). Contradictory
claims are key to Weatherson’s hypothesis. An author cannot successfully claim that a
knife and fork are actually a television and an armchair (unless, presumably, the knife
and fork could transform) (pp. 5, 14-15), that a five-fingered maple leaf is actually the
shape of an oval (p. 4), or that murdering two people for slowing traffic is morally
praiseworthy (pp. 1-2). Each of these examples should cause imaginative resistance,
Weatherson claims, in part because the details of the contradictions which cause
resistance are emphasized (p. 18).
Importantly for what is to come, Weatherson’s argument suggests that claims in a
fictional world which might cause imaginative resistance can be ignored. Weatherson
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claims that it is the author who wields this power by controlling how fictional claims are
presented (2004, pp. 18, 20), but the reader, too, chooses or wills what to care about and
what to ignore. Readers who are practiced in the art of ignoring information they find
ridiculous or problematic are necessarily less likely to experience imaginative resistance
than are those who have carefully sensitized themselves to inconsistencies. In other
words, readers have, or may have in various cases, a choice about whether they
experience imaginative resistance to inaccurate nonmoral claims or deviant moral claims.
This choice is not one which is made in the moment of potential resistance, but rather one
made through the cultivation of certain reading habits over time.
Nanay (2010) proposes what I refer to as the inappropriate communication
hypothesis, which can be understood as a wontian perspective. Nanay argues that
imaginative resistance should be understood fundamentally as a response to inappropriate
communication (2010). Nanay draws upon Gregory Currie (2003) to emphasize that
fiction is a type of conversation. As Currie puts it, we are right to “think of story-telling
as a rather one-sided conversation” (2003, p. 146). Nanay then draws upon H. P. Grice’s
theory of conversational implicature (1975) to claim that imaginative resistance is a
reaction to fictional claims which the author made in violation of the cooperative
principle. The cooperative principle is a rule for conversation which we naturally obey,
according to Grice. According to this principle, a conversation should and is expected to
continue from one relevant comment to the next relevant comment. If a comment is
made which does not appear to be relevant, the message-receiver of this seemingly
irrelevant message works to interpret the message under the assumption that it is making
relevant implications even if what is literally said does not seem obviously relevant
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(Grice, 1975). In other words, when you violate the cooperative principle, others assume
you are making a hidden point, and they seek to understand it as such. The following
conversational example is given in Grice’s “Logic and Conversation” (1975):

A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.

Taken at face value, Person B has responded with a non sequitur. However, one
takes B to be implying that Smith has a girlfriend in New York (Grice, 1975). This
assumption can be made due to the rule of conversation that responses should be relevant.
It may be that Person B has no intention of making this claim, but if that is true, B has
violated the cooperative principle. As such, Person A must work to interpret the
implications of B’s statement, and this work can cause pause in conversation which is the
same as the pause a reader experiences in what is often referred to as imaginative
resistance, according to Nanay (2010). Nanay further suggests that we do not experience
imaginative resistance equally across genres, and this is because we have different
expectations for adherence to the cooperative principle based upon the genre with which
we are engaged (2010).
Each of the above-noted hypotheses is important for the analysis of applying
imaginative resistance to communication. Before we continue, I will summarize the
above types. As noted, these hypotheses fall into the following two categories, created
by Gendler (2006b; Liao & Gendler, in press):
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(1) Cantian Perspectives: Imaginative resistance is rooted in a
reader’s absolute inability to imagine a proposed aspect of a
fictional world.

(2) Wontian Perspectives: Imaginative resistance is rooted in a
reader’s refusal to imagine a proposed aspect of a fictional world.

Briefly, the four key hypotheses discussed above are as follows:

(1) Impossibility Hypothesis: Walton’s cantian perspective is that
imaginative resistance is caused by immutable supervenience
relationships between a reader’s moral reality and the fictional
moral reality presented by the author.

(2) Moral Contagion Hypothesis: Gendler’s perspective that
imaginative resistance is caused by the wontian refusal to engage
in imaginative acts with deviant moral claims for fear that one
might be infected in some way by the deviant morality simply
through the act of imagining it.

(3) Attention-to-Conflict Hypothesis: Weatherson’s cantian
perspective which claims that impossibility to engage is
experienced when a contradiction in the text is emphasized through
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the author’s choices of how to depict or the reader’s choices in
how to engage with it.

(4) Inappropriate Communication Hypothesis: Nanay’s wontian
perspective that imaginative resistance is experienced as a
violation of the Gricean cooperative principle in a conversation
between author and reader. The reader then refuses to engage with
the text as written, instead searching for implications that can
explain away the violation.

It is important to note that Gendler argues that sometimes an unwillingness to
engage with an idea imaginatively can result in an inability to do so (2006b, p. 156).
Therefore, even if we agree with the cantian perspectives, we can evaluate them in terms
of whether at the root there is an unwillingness causing the impossibility of imagining.

3.1.1.1 Types of Imaginative Resistance
Gendler and other theorists not only distinguish between types of hypotheses regarding
imaginative resistance but also aspects of the phenomenon itself. These become central
to distinguishing between aspects of these hypotheses which are relevant to
communication and aspects which are not.
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For the sake of this thesis, I focus on one characterization of the types of
imaginative resistance. Shen-yi Liao and Gendler (in press) piece apart the debate along
the lines of four different puzzles, which can be understood as follows:

(1) Imaginability Puzzle: Why do readers sometimes refuse, or find
themselves unable to accept, the invitation to make-believe which
is standard to engagement with works of fiction? (Liao & Gendler,
in press)

(2) Fictionality Puzzle: Why, when readers typically accept the
authority of authors to define the terms of their fictional world
(“authorial authority”), do readers sometimes reject this authority
as insufficient to allow for certain kinds of claims? (Liao &
Gendler, in press)

(3) Phenomenological Puzzle: Why do readers sometimes
understand the author to be asking the reader to believe a
proposition in the real world which is made in the fictional world
rather than simply imagine that it is true only to the fictional world?
(Liao & Gendler, in press ; Gendler, 2006b)
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(4) Aesthetic Value Puzzle: Why do readers sometimes find that a
work of fiction is aesthetically compromised by claims made
within it? (Liao & Gendler, in press)

The imaginability puzzle is addressed by all four hypotheses discussed in the
previous section, and is the most consistently addressed puzzle by philosophers in the
debate regarding imaginative resistance. This puzzle highlights the strangeness of
readers being unable or unwilling to imagine certain propositions even while engaging
with fiction, where the invitation to imagine is central. What we can and cannot imagine
or what we are willing or unwilling to imagine are central to any theory of imaginative
resistance, including those applicable to other forms of communication.
The fictionality puzzle or puzzle of the breakdown of authorial authority is
addressed by many philosophers engaged in this debate. This puzzle is based on the
assumption that the author has a default authority in dictating the terms and fictional
reality of her work. Whether or not we agree with this assumption, the fictionality puzzle
highlights how particular claims made by an author can result in the author losing her
authority to dictate the terms of her fictional reality.
The phenomenological puzzle is a contested assertion by philosophers in this
debate. Are authors sometimes asking readers to believe when they should only be
asking readers to imagine? Or are there claims themselves that whenever uttered are
necessarily assertions about real-world reality rather than fictional reality?
The aesthetic value puzzle is addressed by Hume, Walton, and only a few others
in the debate on imaginative resistance, but it is a key aspect of imaginative resistance.
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This puzzle may seem to be the most obviously limited to works of fiction, at least to
those engaged in the debate. After all, aesthetic value is an appraisal of art forms.
Though, of course, aesthetic value is deeply important to rhetorical effectiveness.
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CHAPTER 4. IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE AND COMMUNICATION

4.1

Narrowing the Puzzles

While all of the aforementioned puzzles can be applied to real-world (rather than fictional)
communication, for the sake of this thesis, I argue that the imaginability puzzle and
fictionality puzzle are the most obviously useful in the field of communication. To
understand this, I redefine these two puzzles based on broader, communicative
definitions:

(1) Imaginability Puzzle: Imagination is a key to open-mindedness.
We must be both willing and able to imagine narratives presented
by a message-sender in order to receive the message in a way close
to how it was intended. Why do we sometimes refuse, or find
ourselves unable to accept, the invitation to imagine the viewpoints
of someone else, when doing so is a basic requirement of engaging
with others?

(2) Fictionality Puzzle (better regarded here as the Breakdown of
Authority Puzzle): Authors have authorial authority because we
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see them as the foremost experts in their fictional world. Similarly,
we allow experts to make all kinds of claims about material we do
not understand, and we usually accept these claims on the basis
that they are made for the experts. Why do message-receivers
sometimes reject this authority as insufficient to allow for certain
kinds of claims even when the expert has not overstepped the
boundaries of their expertise?

4.1.1 The Imaginability Puzzle
The imaginability puzzle, I believe, is absolutely essential to understanding our current
climate of escalating polarization. Why is it that when people attempt to have a
conversation and then ground their communication style in opposing narratives do the
individuals reject even the invitation to imagine the other person’s perspective? Is it
because, as Gendler would argue regarding fiction, that one is concerned about moral
contagion? I will leave the medical euthanasia debate here, and consider another
example, to illustrate the phenomenon in a broader arena. Consider the following
common (though perhaps unusually tame) dialogue between a religious Pro-Life activist,
A, and an atheist Pro-Choice activist, B:

A: How can you even think about murdering your own child?
B: It’s not murder, and it’s not a child. It’s a fetus. I’m a person,
and I have rights.
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A: Your rights don’t trump the rights of a child.
B: It’s not a child. It’s a fetus.
A: Life begins at conception.
B: A zygote begins at conception. Sure, late-term abortion might
be pretty harsh, but early-term abortion isn’t murder. The fetus
isn’t a person yet. I, however, am a person. I have rights to my
own bodily integrity. I am not an incubator or prisoner.
A: Motherhood is sacred. God gave you that child. It was your
choice to have sex, and so you already chose to have this baby.
B: Sex has other purposes than reproduction. And God had
nothing to do with this. A little plastic condom broke.
A: As God intended.

In the above example, Person A and Person B are talking past one another,
because their communication is situated in different narratives and different narrativebased values. Most of us can easily imagine conversations such as these not going as
well as the above conversation. Often, two people with such dramatically opposed views
will argue heatedly and end the conversation with deep resentment or even hatred. In the
above example, A and B sometimes engage and directly reject each other’s narrative
interpretations of the situation, but never do they actually entertain each other’s narratives.
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A is unwilling or unable to imagine that B is correct, that the fetus in question is not a
baby and that terminating it is not murder. Her deeply held values, which are based in,
and often asserted through, religious, communal, and societal narratives, are incompatible
with the narratives B presents. B is likewise unwilling or unable to imagine that A is
correct.
Perhaps the best way to understand A and B’s refusal to engage with opposing
narratives is to understand that their values have been developed through intricate
communication. To even imagine the opposing narrative would be to risk being
influenced by it. Here we see Gendler’s moral contagion hypothesis at work. Each
interlocutor is worried that she will be infected by the viewpoints of the other if she dares
to merely imagine the key points of the opposing narrative.

4.1.1.1 Breakdown of Authority Puzzle
What about authorial authority, or, what I call the breakdown of authority puzzle? If we
consider authors to be foremost experts on their world communicating to us in a sort of
narrative lecture about the world, we can see how this expertise is similar to say, a
foremost expert in evolutionary biology or organizational communication, or, perhaps,
the foremost expert in their own experiences. Unless we have reason to doubt the ability
of the expert before engaging, we are likely to take assertions of her expertise to be
reason to believe when she make claims within her area of expertise. But what if we
engage with an author’s work after a friend we trust tells us that she is a terrible writer?
Are we likely to engage with the work in the same way? What if we engage with the
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evolutionary biologist after our pastor tells us that this person or this field of inquiry
cannot be trusted? In these cases, the credibility of the expert (or the expert’s topic) has
been injured by testimonies received or narratives engaged with and believed prior to the
act of communication. As is well-known, a communicator can lose credibility before,
during, or after an act of communication. If, during the act of communication, a speaker
presents false information or communicates in a way that offends the audience, the
audience may stop engaging with the speaker. But why? I believe the answer is, in part,
imaginative resistance.

4.1.1.1.1 Offenses Causing Imaginative Resistance
In my own evaluation, imaginative resistance can be understood as resulting from two
kinds of offenses: (1) value offenses and (2) communication offenses. And, in most cases,
both offenses exist at the same time. Value offenses are experienced when messagereceivers resist a claim because it violates their deeply held values, which, are themselves,
rooted in narratives (Fisher, 1984). Communication offenses, on the other hand, are
violations of accepted or expected communicative roles, styles, or narratives. If we
sometimes refuse (or are unwilling) to imagine a claim, it may be because (1) it violates
our deeply held values or (2) because the person making the claim does not have the
authority to appropriately do so. The latter encompasses the fictionality puzzle as well as
the imaginability puzzle. We may also experience the phenomenological puzzle for
either reason, either because a claim violates our values so deeply that we feel that if the
claim is asserted by an author about a fictional world (or, as I will soon argue, by a
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interlocutor about the real world) it must be that the author is asking us to challenge our
beliefs and believe the other’s deviant assertion, or because we understand the author to
have overstepped her bounds as a world-creator and stepped into the realm of valuedictating in the real world. Again, these are overlapping interpretations. The aesthetic
value puzzle is represented by either offense as well. In new traditions of rhetoric, we
often assess appropriate artistry and approaches to communication based on act, scene,
agent, agency, and purpose. Lack of fit to any of these purposes can result in a speech (or
other act of communication) to be judged inappropriate and lose some or all aesthetic
value. Lack of fit to any of these purposes can also result in value offenses, such as those
that can occur when someone reveals beliefs which are opposed by people in the
audience or other interlocutors in interpersonal or small-group communication.
Nanay, as we saw, claims that imaginative resistance is simply a response to
violations in the Gricean cooperative principle (2010). Liao & Gendler (in press) later
argue that perspectives like Nanay’s mistake short-term confusion for enduring resistance,
the former of which is not imaginative resistance. In fact, Gendler mentions the Gricean
cooperative principle in one of her articles and dismisses it outright (2006b). While it
seems reasonable to assess Nanay as having been confused about how to apply the
cooperative principle, Nanay nevertheless makes an important observation: The
conversational aspects of the author-reader relationship are central to understanding the
phenomenon of imaginative resistance. I agree.
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4.1.1.1.2 Referents and Appraisal
In “Imaginative Resistance Revisited” (2006b), Gendler notes that there is a difference
between concepts such as “maggots” or “bumblebees” and those such as “right” or “true.”
She does not define the difference, however, except to imply that the latter are related to
morality. I argue, instead, that the former have real-world referents, while the latter are
complex concepts which we develop, maintain, and augment purely through
communication, which makes them especially important to us and also susceptible to
being altered if we allow ourselves to engage opposing viewpoints. We cannot, in other
words, simply point to “rightness” in the real world to remind ourselves of what it is and
undo any sway the communication process has had over us.
Even when we combine creatures in myth, we have real-world referents in which
to ground their combined features. What is a Pegasus besides a “horse” with “wings,”
two things that exist clearly in the world. “Rightness” and “goodness,” as noted, are
concepts that we come to understand through complex engagement with the world which
is rooted in communication on a variety of levels from intrapersonal to organizational and
cultural. We struggle as we grow up to develop values, and those around us struggle to
guide us toward values they hold. Our parents need not worry about whether we
understand that a cat is a cat, because a cat is always a cat. This is simply taught through
picture-books, TV images, and petting furry felines in the real world. But across groups
and cultures, we disagree about what “rightness” and “goodness” are. We disagree
because no one can point to something and say, “There it is! Goodness!” Instead,
through conversation with those around us which are often rooted in broader, ancient
theological, philosophic, or cultural narratives, we and those around us struggle to create
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and maintain a particular picture of these concepts. And, so, these concepts are rooted in
communication and rooted in narrative.
Appraisal, which Gendler argues is essential to understanding what causes
imaginative resistance (2006b), does come into play with concepts such as “rightness” or
“goodness,” but perhaps it is not the moral nature of these questions per se that makes
them more likely to evoke imaginative resistance but rather the depth of the narrative
conflict in the surrounding culture. Our parents and communities often take our moral
upbringing to be of paramount importance. Other things of such depth of importance, as
taught, can cause equally serious cases of imaginative resistance. Imagine, for example,
a man who was raised to believe that being macho is a requirement of his basic worth so
much so that his social ties, status, and even survival may be threatened if he is not
macho. If this man is faced with narratives which seem to attack his masculinity, he is
likely to resist, to refuse to engage those narratives because they pose a threat to his
entrenched social and personal values which, themselves, are constructed through
communication.
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CHAPTER 5. IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE IN THE MEDICAL EUTHANASIA
DEBATE

5.1

Goals for the Application of Imaginative Resistance

Let’s return to the passage in my introduction from I. A. Richards, “[T]he chief lesson to
be learnt…is the futility of all argumentation that precedes understanding. We cannot
profitably attack any opinion until we have discovered what it expresses as well as what
it states…” (Richards, 1991, p. 28). Whether our goal is to attack, defend, mediate, or
appeal to, Richards’ insight applies. Arguing without understanding the perspective of
the other side or sides is not only futile but carries the potential to deepen polarization
and its associated animosity (Doherty, 2014), by playing into conflicting rhetoric.
The primary goal, then, of the application of the theory of imaginative resistance
to cases of conflicting rhetoric, is to try to uncover the worldview, or reality, of each side,
so that the mutual unimaginability of narratives which prevents active and effective
discussion can be mitigated, and to examine reasons each side may have for resisting due
to concerns over contagion, as defined by Gendler.

5.1.1

Methods

The theory of imaginative resistance in communication proposes that there are situations
in which communication breaks down between parties because one, both, or all sides find
themselves unable to imagine the perspective of the other as being valid or even possible.
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The arguments, claims, or even terms used by the other side clash deeply with one’s
deeply held beliefs—beliefs held so deeply that it is, rather than just a heated discussion
or ideological battle, a battle between incompatible realities.
To evaluate whether this theory is viable, one should first examine the apparent
polarization in the debate. When polarization appears to be present, it becomes important
to read arguments, claims, and perspectives made by the targeted side or sides as well as
reading research about the experience and perspectives of each side, or conducting this
research yourself. For the sake of this thesis, I am focusing on the perspective of Not
Dead Yet, and utilizing Not Dead Yet and broader disability rights sources and studies to
uncover issues in compatibility between their perspective and that of Compassion &
Choices, and, perhaps, the broader culture. I have reviewed most of Behuniak’s sources
on Not Dead Yet which remain available; as well as broader sources from Not Dead Yet;
including writings by Lydia Brown, a disability rights activist they regularly praise and
who sometimes authors posts for their “News & Commentary” blog; and several sources
from Compassion & Choices. I have also reviewed several books and articles about the
medical euthanasia debate which discuss the disability rights perspective as well as
Disability Rhetoric, a volume by rhetorician Jay Dolmage. Through these sources, I
sought to answer the following questions:

(1) Is imaginative resistance occurring in this case?
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(2) If so, from what worldview or perspective is Not Dead Yet
approaching this debate which is incompatible with that of
Compassion & Choices?

(3) How can this worldview be articulated in a way that
experientially illustrates the reasons behind Not Dead Yet’s
perspective and basic dignity rhetoric in a way that may be
understood by members of Compassion and Choices?

(4) What about this worldview, if anything, may suggest reasons
for resistance due to concerns over contagion.

5.1.1.1 Is Imaginative Resistance Occurring?
Perhaps it is true that some polarization occurs because sides simply disagree strongly
without existing in, and perceiving through, distinctly different realities. I claim, though,
that where there is polarization with corresponding aggression and animosity, there is
likely to also be imaginative resistance. Therefore, the first question is whether there is
polarization in this debate.
In the broader disability activist perspectives on medical euthanasia, there is
definite disagreement about how people with disabilities should be protected, but there is
overall agreement that the best protection is to prevent the legalization of medical
euthanasia (Behuniak, 2011). According to Behuniak (2011), the dominant perspective
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among disability activists is to oppose any and all legalization of medical euthanasia
because of the perceived threat it poses to people with disabilities. Furthermore, Not
Dead Yet regularly states that all—or most—disability rights activists oppose legalized
medical euthanasia because of its danger (Not Dead Yet, 2010, as cited in Behuniak,
2011; Not Dead Yet, 2015).
Let’s look at three examples of how Not Dead Yet frames the issue of medical
euthanasia: (1) Not Dead Yet discusses the history of their organization as a response to
the deadly “wake up call for the disability rights movement,” which they outline as
follows: “Society’s response” to disabled patients wanting “freedom” from nursing
homes was “denying them freedom, but granting them death” (Not Dead Yet, 2015). (2)
Not Dead Yet emphasizes that physicians are “gatekeepers”: “Anyone could ask for
assisted suicide, but physicians decide who gets it” (Not Dead Yet, 2015). Physicians
decide who is terminally ill and will die within six months—all of whom Not Dead Yet
says are disabled—and it is “well documented” that physicians often make mistakes
about who will die when (Not Dead Yet, 2015). According to a Not Dead Yet blog post
by activist Lydia Brown (2015, February 5), “Many disabled people live with severe,
chronic pain, multiple co-occurring physical, cognitive, and psychiatric conditions, and
repeated and incorrect prognoses of early deaths.” (3) As a related issue, ableism is
regarded as a constant pressure and danger. According to Brown’s post (2015, February
5) “Our world is dominated by public discourse that considers disabled lives inherently
defective, burdensome, suffering, and not worth living.” Increasing the aforementioned
dangers, Brown says, are numerous holes in the safeguards in legalized medical
euthanasia law, including the Oregon law, in particular, that does not demand autopsies to
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confirm that a patient was terminal, allows caregivers or heirs to gain and administer
lethal doses to patients potentially without that patient’s free consent, and does not
protect patients from being “coerced” into receiving medical euthanasia by insurance
companies which prefer to cut costs by terminating the patient than paying for her health
care coverage, all of which can be seen as dangerous extensions of ableism in a broken
healthcare system (2015, February 5).
When you visit the Not Dead Yet website, and then visit the Compassion &
Choices website, there are several things that may immediately jump out at you. The Not
Dead Yet website has a horror-movie style logo, which shares more in common with a
social movement like Anonymous, the loosely organized international coalition of
“hacktivists” (hacker-activists) which takes an aggressive rhetorical and practical stance,
than with Compassion & Choices. The logo has certain inconsistencies which suggest a
less professional origin than the logo for Compassion & Choices. The website uses black,
white, and a single shade of grayish navy blue. The website is clearly active, illustrated
by ongoing news and commentary listed in a single, thick column down the center, and
on its own, the website seems like it may be well-supported. However, when you click
over to Compassion & Choices, the difference in level of support, power, and confidence
within the system is striking.
The clean, upbeat corporate lines, logos, and overall professionalism of the
Compassion & Choices website shows that the group not only has a gentler persona, but
also money and connections (2015). The page has a white and multi-hue blue color
scheme which is soothing and supportive. This supportiveness is echoed in pictures of
people seeking “death with dignity” who are posing for pictures happily in meadows of
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flowers or being embraced by loved ones or even celebrities. There is a helpline link,
with a gentle orange logo, which reads, “Call an End-of-Life Consultant” (Compassion &
Choices, 2015). One column over, there is a large “Take Action” image in blues and the
same gentle orange, which encourages you to engage with the movement in your state.
Not Dead Yet claims that a dangerous power in the voices of their progressive opponents
is their “privilege” (Brown, 2015, February 5). One can see privilege and power just on
their website home page. That this apparent privilege is being actively embraced and
used for political and social capital by Compassion & Choices on their site and
condemned distantly by Not Dead Yet and other disability rights activists shows a divide
and, again, echoes the less powerful situation in which disability rights activists find
themselves.
Rhetoric, both textual and visual, support a sharp divide in perspective, values,
and power between the two groups, Not Dead Yet and Compassion & Choices. These
details, plus that each side has opposite advocacy in the medical euthanasia debate and
their consistent and continuous unwillingness to engage with one another on their stated
issues of value—“death with dignity” for Compassion & Choices and safeguarding
threatened people with disabilities for Not Dead Yet—suggests polarization is present.

5.1.1.1.1 Living in a World of Disability and Ability Myth
A major issue for disability rights activists is their perceived operation within a world that
devalues people with disabilities, and their existence. On the home page for Not Dead
Yet, there are images of people who are engaged in the debate and wish to live, with
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corresponding lines such as “The message was loud and clear: ‘I can help you die…’”
and “The doctor said it would be better if I didn’t survive” (2015). Blog posts, news
bulletins, pamphlets, and action memos all reflect this deep concern that able-bodied
doctors will encourage those with disabilities to take advantage of medical euthanasia due
to prejudice.
For the purpose of establishing the nature of the reality that is perceived by Not
Dead Yet, it does not matter whether these claims from disabled patients are real, nor
whether they accurately reflect the attitudes and suggestions of doctors that they
encounter. However, investigations of actual and perceived experience are essential to
understanding one’s reality or worldview. In this case, the concerns voiced by Not Dead
Yet are verified by academic studies which have outlined ways in which people with
disabilities are treated as lesser in our culture and even encouraged to be cured or just die.
Jay T. Dolmage, in his extensive work, Disability Rhetoric (2014), highlights
eleven myths told continuously through our popular culture about people with disabilities.
Before focusing on one of these eleven myths, I will briefly outline each to illustrate an
overall pattern:

(1) Disability as Pathology: Disability is described and defined by
someone who is not disabled in terms of how significantly and in
what ways the person deviates from standardized norms.

(2) Kill-or-Cure: In works of fiction, a prominent disabled
character will either be killed or cured by the end of the work.
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(3) Overcoming or Compensation: The person with disabilities has
a special talent which, as Dolmage puts it, “offsets their
deficiencies” (2014, p. 35).

(4) Disability as Object of Pity and/or Charity: A disabled
character is presented as a sad, impotent problem, one which can
be solved through charity.

(5) Physical Deformity as Sign of Internal Flaw: Through
descriptions of bodily difference which accentuate its “foreignness,
abnormality, or exoticness,” (Dolmage, 2014, p. 35) insinuations
about internal deformity, such as of character or mental health are
made.

(6) Disability as Isolating and Individuated: The disability
overwhelms the person’s life, causing an isolation which can be
viewed as the natural consequence of disability.

(7) Disability as Sign of Social Ill: People with disabilities
represent the deep social failings of their society.

(8) Disability Is a Sign from Above: Disability is caused by sacred
will or used as part of ritual processes to send a message.
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(9) Disability as Symptom of Human Abuse of Nature: Living out
of harmony with nature, at best, and defiling it, at worse, causes
disability or is represented in fiction by disability in defiling
characters.

(10) Disability Drift and the Disability Hierarchy: People with
physical disabilities are perceived as having mental or cognitive
disabilities and vice versa.

(11) Disability Drop: In a work of fiction, this myth plays out
when a character is shown to have been “faking” their disabilities.
(Dolmage, 2014, pp. 34-47)

These myths, which pervade cultures in religious rituals and proclamations about
the will of God to entertainment and policy-making, are deeply negative. Some of these
myths blame society or its deviation from God’s will; several of these myths blame the
person who has a disability, whether by making it her fault or by insinuating that the
disability is being faked; and all of these myths emphasize the idea that disability is
deeply, powerfully, even lethally undesirable. The “kill-or-cure” myth is perhaps the
most severe example of this: It is better to die than to live if your disability cannot be
corrected.
The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is notorious for his strong and callous
language, but he often emphasizes and exaggerates sentiments felt by others, whether a
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minority or majority. I include the below passage from Nietzsche to illustrate the
sentiments of some, and the underlying perceptions and cultural-historical ideas which
may be influencing others. This passage is from Twilight of the Idols, and Nietzsche
states that he is offering “[a] moral code for physicians.”

The invalid is a parasite on society. In a certain state it is indecent
to go on living. To vegetate on in cowardly dependence on
physicians and medicaments after the meaning of life, the right to
life, has been lost ought to entail the profound contempt of society.
Physicians, in their turn, ought to be the communicators of this
contempt—not prescriptions, but every day a fresh dose of disgust
with their patients….To die proudly when it is no longer possible
to live proudly. Death of one’s own free choice, death at the
proper time, with a clear head and with joyfulness, consummated
in the midst of children and witnesses: so that an actual leavetaking is possible which he who is leaving is still there….We have
no power to prevent ourselves being born: but we can rectify this
effort—for sometimes it is an error.” (Nietzsche, 1990, pp. 99-100)

All of these myths and ideas interplay to create a culture which has negative
stereotypes of people with disabilities and becoming a person with a disability which are
likely to influence someone who is faced with disability in themselves or others. The
medical euthanasia debate turns the kill-or-cure myth and Nietzsche’s idea of dying
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proudly when life is an error into a potentially devastating reality. As a subculture faced
with this kill-or-cure myth, it becomes quite understandable why the vast majority of
disability activists would oppose medical euthanasia when those being euthanized are
almost exclusively defined by their groups as people with disabilities. The picture which
emerges is this one: Because the patient in question cannot be cured of a loathsome
condition which robs of dignity and any purpose at all, she should be killed.

5.1.1.2 Contested Reality: The Threat of the Super-Abled World
As an able-bodied person, many may find this perception of society’s threat difficult to
imagine. As a way of breaking down imaginative barriers for the able-bodied reader, I
will present a thought experiment which I call, “The Threat of the Super-Abled World.”
Imagine that you are living in a world where nearly everyone else has super
powers. They are super-abled. They can fly, have enhanced strength which makes it
child’s play to lift two-ton slabs of concrete, recycle nutrients within their bodies which
means they have no need for expelling wastes, and can hold their breath for long journeys
under water or at extreme altitudes. Because everyone, just about, has these abilities, all
of society is based around them. People fly to work, lifting off of the ground seemingly
effortlessly and navigating flight traffic into great cities which reach impossibly high into
the sky. Construction workers lift great weight with a single finger. Doors are heavy
with beautiful metal and stone embellishments. No one struggles to carry their overladen book bags or briefcases. There is little need for stairways or elevators, only vertical

56
flight corridors. Travel is fast, efficient, and downright cheap. All the super-abled need
is a thicker coat to manage the chill of rushing through the air.
Now, every so often someone is born with a strange condition where these
abilities are absent. These people become an instant burden to the society since they are
unable to engage with society in the ways in which society was built to be engaged. They
have to ask a super-abled friend or family member to fly them to work. They must go out
of their way to try to find scarce stairways or elevators in skyscrapers where everyone
else zooms up. It may take them three times as long, or more, to reach a higher floor
because of these delays. Some buildings don’t offer stairways or elevators at all, or
they’re placed in strange places that are difficult to get to if you cannot fly. The
architects seem to be super-abled, too, and even their attempts at meeting your needs
often fail to consider the breadth of your limitations. In the elevators, buttons are placed
too high or take too much force to engage.
But worse than transportation are the horrible indignities of daily life and
appearance. Everyone can tell you are not super-abled just by looking at you. Your
muscles aren’t properly defined, your skin doesn’t show the telltale refreshment of so
much good air, and you breathe too much. It annoys people.
You try your best to not talk about the worst part, how you have to find these
horrible, dirty “restrooms” in which to expel the waste your body can’t recycle. The
indignity of this waste expulsion process disgusts the super-abled, and they can’t imagine
having to live with such a terribly base need. And, worse, someone has to design, clean,
and maintain these restrooms. You are spreading your indignity around, becoming an
undignified burden on those around you.

57
The super-abled wonder why you would want to live like you are. They talk
about how if they ever endured one of those rare accidents that could turn a super-abled
person into someone like you, they would hope it kills them instead. They understand if
you want to die, and some of them secretly, or not-so-secretly, wish you just would die so
that you would stop forcing them to make accommodations for you. Your loved ones get
tired sometimes, and wish there were some way you needed less. Some of them start to
think you like the attention of getting carted around or probably could fly if you would
just do your exercises. Your insurance company will not pay for devices to help your
mobility or make it easier for you to carry heavy things. These are expensive. You are
expensive. It’s unreasonable.
People have been advancing legislation to allow the super-abled who endure
accidents causing them to lose one or all of their abilities to receive help killing
themselves painlessly and with loving support. As these policies advance, more and
more people begin to advocate for the idea that you—a born dis/regularly abled person—
should take advantage of them. Your life is a painful and horrible accident. It’s
understandable and okay if you want help to die. You are supported. Your insurance
company tells you that they will not pay for a treatment that could help you levitate and,
therefore, achieve some increased mobility, but they will pay for the lethal drug which is
now legal for doctors to prescribe to you. Your insistence on trying to live is becoming
burdensome in itself.
On a daily basis, you are faced with people who won’t look at you because you
make them uncomfortable, who leave the room or fall silent when you enter, and people
who treat you as incapable of following a simple argument or example because they
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assume you have cognitive impairments. When you get angry about how you are treated,
people seem uncomfortable, and they don’t listen. Of course you are angry, they think.
You have a disability no one would want. Your life is a terrible, sad, and undignified
thing.
You have a small circle of friends who do not have super abilities either. Two
weeks ago, one of them decided her doctor and brother were right; she decided to consent
to a dignified death rather than continuing on in her miserable indignities. You wanted to
beg her to reconsider, but she wouldn’t respond to your texts or phone calls. You knew
she had felt lonely for years because her family would go on flying trips in the Rocky
Mountains and the Alps without her, her coworkers never invited her to their parties, and
her boyfriend of five years had angrily flown off, fed up for some reason she was sure
was the burden of her disabilities. You called her family, trying to tell them you thought
your friend was depressed and needed help, but they responded that it was understandable
that she was depressed, because her disabilities were so terrible. The help she truly
needed was to be free from the burden of life, they said. Nothing you could think to say
changed their minds. The next time you were at the doctor, you overheard a nurse talking
to another patient with your condition about the option to die, and he, too, was
considering it. When you got into the doctor’s office, the nurse and then the doctor
talked to you about the option. The message was becoming very clear: You should die.
Because you defecate, cannot fly, and need special accommodations, you should die.
In this thought experiment, the legalization of medical euthanasia puts this special
class of people, those without super powers, at great risk because society does not
understand how or why the regularly-abled could value their own lives. In this fictional
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but nearby world, society resists providing the accommodations regularly-abled people
need. This thought experiment is meant to provide an imaginative window into the
perceived reality of the disability rights activist—a window, if one is needed, into the
idea that opposition to medical euthanasia is the result of a deep threat to the lives of the
disabled from a culture which devalues them. Once we are in this position and see the
world from this point of view, we may see more easily why it is difficult for disability
rights activists to engage with, or even respect, the pro-medical euthanasia perspectives
of groups like Compassion & Choices, groups which are actively disregarding the lethal
danger to people with disabilities and the active devaluing of their very existence by the
legalizing of a death one is expected to prefer over life.
At this point, a reader may feel compelled to argue with these claims or support
them. However, the purpose of applying imaginative resistance is not to convince us of
the correctness or moral truth of a perspective but rather to help us understand the
worldview from which a person or group is approaching a debate. From this
understanding, each side can engage more effectively. Whether we agree or not is not the
issue when applying imaginative resistance, except when working to understand the
biases we may bring to an analysis.
From the point of view I just outlined, then, it is easy to see why discussion of
“death with dignity” by Compassion & Choices can seem a perversion of the concept of
dignity. In the super-abled world, it is considered an indignity to have to use a bathroom
to expel waste, just as in the real world the need for an assistant or special facilities in
order to use the bathroom is considered an indignity by regularly-abled people. But, in
the super-abled world, to consider a person’s need for bathrooms a sufficient reason to
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say that that person’s life lacks basic dignity and worth is, regularly-abled people will
want to say, perverse. This appears to be the valuing of a personal fear, or, at best, a
personal preference, over the lives of regularly-abled people. Therefore, in the superabled world, it looks to the regularly-abled as though the super-abled consider personal
dignity to be more important than basic dignity. And this perceived emphasis of personal
dignity and complete disregard for basic dignity is simply appalling, even evil. The
parallel with members of Not Dead Yet in the real world is obvious. To Not Dead Yet, it
looks as though most of society employs a value system in which personal dignity is
more important than basic dignity, in which personal preference is valued more than the
basic respect for all people and their existence. This perception colors Not Dead Yet’s
understanding of every kind of rhetoric that comes out of the larger society.
On the other side, Compassion & Choices likely does not understand the depths of
these concerns or the experiences they stem from; their worldview does not leave room
for Not Dead Yet’s arguments and leaves them ignoring those arguments as irrational or
even oppressive of those who are suffering.
To reiterate, the point of this thought experiment is to enable readers who are not
initially sympathetic to the concerns of Not Dead Yet to see the world as Not Dead Yet
sees it. Once we accustom ourselves to the point of view of Not Dead Yet—that is to say,
accustom ourselves to their worldview and perceived reality—it becomes hard to
understand how anyone could deny that what is infinitely valuable appears to be being
devalued and dismissed by the other side (again, whether or not it actually is being
devalued and dismissed or not is not the issue), which may be having serious
consequences. Similar epiphanies are likely to follow a corresponding analysis of
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Compassion & Choices’ worldview. Through these analyses, we are able to do
something that is normally very hard to do: step into each side’s worldview and see how,
from here, the point of view of the other side is difficult to imagine and, thus, understand.
More specifically, from within one worldview, the value system that sustains the
arguments and opinions of the other worldview is very difficult to “hold in mind” for any
length of time. This is the problem created by contested realities.

5.1.1.2.1 Contagion
From the perspective of Not Dead Yet, we can now see that those within Not Dead Yet
may experience imaginative resistance to arguments, claims, and even terms posited by
groups like Compassion & Choices. To even be willing to imagine arguments from the
perspective of Compassion & Choices may seem like a dangerous betrayal of one’s own
community, one which, worse, could result in a deviation from the message would could
weaken the cause. On the other side, Compassion & Choices may be experiencing a
similar fear of contagion. If either side dares to imagine the experience of the other, they
may feel compelled to change their mission. As we have seen through “The Threat of the
Super-Abled World,” if one tries to imagine the world from the perspective of someone
whose cause may threaten your own, you may be tempted to sympathize with their cause.
Gendler’s contagion hypothesis makes it clear why some would be concerned with even
trying to engage with this narrative reality. While understanding your opponents may be
essential to effective debate, perhaps imagining the perspectives of your opponent is also
deeply dangerous to one’s cause.
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5.1.1.2.2 Understanding and Traversing Contested Reality
By understanding the worldview and perceived reality of those on each side of this debate,
each side (and those outside the debate) may be able to eventually actively and
effectively discuss their concerns with the other. By understanding that imaginative
resistance creates barriers to this understanding which are unique, such as the deeply felt
and sometimes reflexive fear of contagion, those outside of the debate can more carefully
work with those within it to find common ground, if this is their wish.
When polarization occurs, each side no longer listens to the other, and reasonable,
even necessary, concerns are not heard. In the case of a less powerful group, such as Not
Dead Yet, this polarizing effect sharply reduces their ability to affect policy in ways
which may provide some of the safeguards they want in place to protect people with
disabilities from the dangerous myths of a society which devalues them. Compassion &
Choices, by opening up a reasonable dialogue with disability rights groups, could use
their power to make sure that safeguards are in place while new laws are being formed.
But if neither group understands the worldview through which the other is operating,
neither can engage with their opponent in meaningful, constructive ways. It becomes a
battle between whoever can make the sharpest, boldest moves which are received the best
by those who will make the decisions. Battle may be common in our system, but it is,
perhaps, not the best way to make sure all sides are heard.

63

CHAPTER 6. APPLICATION TO FUTURE COMMUNICATION RESEARCH

6.1

Understanding in Polarization

Imaginative resistance, as I have discussed and applied in previous chapters, allows us to
directly assess the worldview and perceived reality beneath the polarized rhetoric in an
array of policy, organizational, and interpersonal debates. By combining a close reading
of a variety of texts from each side while simultaneously seeking further research into
each side’s worldview and then moving from worldview to text rather than from text to
worldview, the understanding Richards implored us to seek becomes locatable in even
the angriest—and least apparently rational—of debates.
Given statistics that show that polarization is increasing in the United States, and
the possible political, economic, social, and interpersonal consequences of this, there are
likely a vast array of debates and perspectives within those debates which could be
analyzed using imaginative resistance. In the medical euthanasia debate, alone, there are
multiple additional sides to analyze, including that of Compassion & Choices, broader
progressive groups, and conservative perspectives, to name just a few. Other political
debates, such as debates about the death penalty, racial profiling, abortion, health care,
and the best economic recovery policies are just a few examples.
Some issues of polarization are potentially deadly, and seeking to understand
these perspectives in their own right rather than externally may help to aid efforts to
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combat dangerous worldviews and perceived realities. Simply arguing against these
perspectives from an outsider’s perspective with all reasonably due condemnation is
likely to increase, rather than help to mitigate, polarization and entrenchment. Examples
of this kind of polarization include extremist religious groups, political groups, and
advocacy groups which advocate, or engage in, discrimination, violence, or terrorism.

6.1.1

A Brief Example of Dangerous Polarization

Recently, Elliot Rodgers went on a shooting spree in California. On May 23rd, 2014,
Rodgers drove through several areas of Santa Barbara, California and shot at people he
encountered. He killed six and injured thirteen, in what has often been referred to as a
“massacre” (Rosenberg, May 27, 2014). While shootings have become commonplace in
the United States, what is unusual about this case is that Rodgers left behind a detailed
manifesto and a chilling video (Rosenberg, May 27, 2014; Garvey, 2014; ytwrecords,
2014). This video made dramatic assertions about reality which have led some to call
him “crazy” or “sociopathic.” Others have pointed out that Rodgers was connected to
certain Men’s Rights groups which engage with a narrative reality vastly different than
that of most people in our society.
Rodgers’ video of his motives before the shooting reveal aspects of this narrative
reality (ytwrecords, 2014). He claims that he has been consistently rejected sexually by
women, that women have “denied” him a happy life, and that due to this, they “deserve to
be annihilated” (ytwrecords, 2014). He also claims that men who have been sexually
active with women have committed a crime, the “crime of living a better life” than him
(ytwrecords, 2014). Rodgers frames his virginity as “suffering” which can be blamed on

65
women because they should prefer him, a “supreme gentleman” to other men whom he
describes as “obnoxious” (ytwrecords, 2014). Rodgers claims that by rejecting him,
women “forced [him] to suffer all [his] life” (ytwrecords, 2014; Garvey, 2014).
Many people had a strong reaction to his assertions. Some supported his claims,
but most rejected them in whole or in part as being a dangerously discriminatory
worldview entrenched in dangerous narratives. Perhaps it is very good that the majority
of people who disagree with Rodgers were often unwilling to engage with his narratives,
but what about Rodgers and others in the Men’s Rights Movement being unwilling or
unable to engage with healthier, less violent, and less discriminatory narratives? If no
one seeks to understand the worldview of this movement and its more extreme members
and people instead simply label these extremists as “crazy,” then it is difficult to
understand their motives or concerns, and, therefore, to know how to try to address these
issues in ways which will have an impact on the number of men who join their informal,
or formal, ranks.

6.1.1.1 Methods and Broad Applications
How can we understand polarized viewpoints? Imaginative resistance allows us to
entertain the idea that the people on both sides are operating from incompatible narratives
and contested realities, and asks the questions:
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(I) How do we engage with each party in such a way as to not
evoke imaginative resistance in order to engage in open-minded
debate or seek solutions to polarization-related problems?

(II) Understanding that each party comes from its pinpointed
reality, how can we adjust the way we speak and think about their
arguments in order to engage with them—or those around them—
more directly, respectfully, and effectively?

(III) Are there levels of concern over moral contagion which may
create additional barriers, and, if so, in what ways may we need to
approach these barriers?

I believe that the answer comes in the second of the two factors I have laid out as
being essential to forms of imaginative resistance. The first is that the act is a value
offense. The second is that the act is a communicative offense. Often, just by framing
our values within our own narrative structures, we instigate conflict. We have committed
a communication offense by telling the other person: “I exist in another world, the only
world that should be considered. Engage on my terms or don’t engage.”
I have presented cases above where imaginative resistance can be useful in
addressing narratives in social movements as well as organizationally or culturally based
narratives as they are expressed in interpersonal communication. I believe that this study
should be approached using rhetorical, qualitative, and eventually quantitative measures.
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If we can assess what, precisely, causes imaginative resistance, we can begin to counter
the trends of polarization that grow more deeply entrenched each time someone commits
a value and communicative offense, thereby intensifying resistance.

6.1.1.1.1 Incommensurability
The theory of imaginative resistance, as I present it and discuss its value in the field of
communication, shares some theoretical and practical features with the concept of
incommensurability. In Paradigms and Barriers (1993), Howard Margolis discusses a
“puzzle” of his own, and introduces incommensurability in a way which clearly shares
key elements with imaginative resistance:

[W]ith respect to habits of mind, situations must arise which
intuitions conflict, and we cannot see easily or at all why they
conflict. In addition, neither side sees any reason to try to see
things as their adversaries do: rather, the puzzle for them lies in
why their adversaries cannot see how weak their case
is….Arguments that seem powerful to one side seem unimportant
to the other. What looks like striking insight to one side looks like
perverse illusion to the other. (p. 20)

Margolis is describing a phenomenon that he, and others, call incommensurability
(1993, p. 20; Harris, 2005). Defined simply, incommensurability is “the lack of a
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common standard for taking the measure of two systems with respect to each other”
(Harris, 2005, p. 3). When applied to rhetoric, incommensurability is regarded as a
serious issue of miscommunication between parties which, when present, “argument fails”
(Harris, June 3, 2012, p. 1). The debate over the usage of the term incommensurability as
well as its parameters and implications are complex and evolving, but the theory has clear
parallels with the theory of imaginative resistance as I outline it here.
Incommensurability discusses what is likely an often overlapping type of
miscommunication as the type highlighted in imaginative resistance, one which is
similarly rooted in incompatibility, whether in worldview, argument, or assumption.
When two ideas conflict and both cannot be true, conflict occurs.
Imaginative resistance helps to both narrow and broaden the applications of
incommensurability to focus on polarization and the incompatibility of worldviews, and
further, offers the insight that fears of moral contagion are central to the issue of why
parties may be refusing to engage, even if it is in their best interests to do so.
Incommensurability also offers new insights which can be considered alongside and
within the theory of imaginative resistance, such as the idea that there may be strong and
weak incommensurability and the consequences thereof (Harris, 2005; June 3, 2012).
Considering these theories together would likely provide valuable insights into both.

6.1.1.1.2 Conclusions
Polarization is a growing problem in the United States. To address this problem, we
require new theoretical approaches to understanding the underlying issues, and new
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insights into aspects of existing theory. Imaginative resistance can be applied to debates,
discussions, and disagreements of a wide variety which are rooted in deeply held beliefs
which differ significantly in their core narratives, assumptions, and conceptions of reality.
The value and insights this theory can provide have been explored through the analysis of
Not Dead Yet’s perspectives in the medical euthanasia debate. I have noted and briefly
discussed several other debates for which this theory is likely to provide important
insights. Understanding the contested realities of parties involved should be explored in
order to devise strategies to bridge these gaps and help to establish dialogue as well as
more effective debate, and in extreme cases, more effective countermeasures.
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